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PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' LIABILITY FOR THE RELEASE OF
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS: A PROPOSED EXPANSION
OF THE THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY
On October 29, 1973, John Steven Gilreath, a twenty-two year
old probationer with a history of sexual assaults and drug abuse,
attacked and murdered Natalia Semler near the Madeira School in
Fairfax County, Virginia. At the time of this tragedy, Gilreath was
undergoing psychotherapy as an outpatient at the Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C. Natalia's murder brought the actions of
Gilreath's psychiatrist and probation officer under judicial scrutiny
in Semler v. Psychiatric Institute.' In Semler, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the psychiatrist and the probation officer were
liable in tort because they had released Gilreath from confinement
in contravention of the procedure prescribed by a Virginia state
court's order. The Fourth Circuit decided that such a breach of a
court order was actionable under a theory of negligence per se and
affirmed a lower court decision for the plaintiff, Natalia Semler's
mother and administratrix. In deciding this case, however, the
court was confronted with difficult questions concerning the treatment and release of mentally ill offenders.
This Comment will examine the basis for imposing tort liability
upon psychotherapists who are under a judicial or statutory obligation to seek a court's approval for a change in their patient's status
and whose failure to obtain such approval results in the release 2
1538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).

2 "Release" will be used in this Comment to cover a wide spectrum of programs
where mental patients are given a greater amount of freedom than that existing

under a regimen of 24-hour confinement. These release programs include day-trips,
holiday and weekend passes, day patient and outpatient treatment, placement in a
"half-way" house, and other plans between absolute confinement and unconditional
release that allow the patient to exercise a greater degree of freedom.
At least 30 states, plus the District of Columbia, have passed statutes that
require persons who are responsible for the confinement of mental patient-offenders
or patients themselves, acting under the approval of their therapists, to obtain
judicial authorization for release. CAL. PNI.AL CODE § 1026a (West Supp. 1976);
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-116 (1973); CoNN. GxN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-47(c)
(1)-(2) (1972); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §403 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301

(e) (1973); HAwAII REv. STAT. §711-94 (1968); Iniao CODE §18-214(2)-(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 913, § 10-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1977); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-14-16-3 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3304
(1974); LA. CODE Cnum. Pno. ANN. art. 648 (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, §2376 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §27 (1972); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 123, §16(e) (Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. §41-21-87 (Supp.
1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040 (Vernon 1976); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-508
(Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-
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of a patient who later harms a third party.3 This Comment
will illustrate that the imposition of tort liability under a theory of
negligence per se may be tantamount to the imposition of strict liability. The rationales for the policy of strict liability and the policy's
impact on mental patient release programs will be examined to
demonstrate how the explicit application of a strict liability theory
to release programs will achieve a more consistent and more desirable policy than the application of a theory of negligence per se.
3.1 (1972); N.Y. Cnmu. Pao. LAw § 330.02 (McKinney 1971) (amended McKinney
Supp. 1976); N.C. Ga, . STAT. § 122-84 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.340
(1975); R.I. Gm. LAws Az . 26-4-4e (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. 32-983
(Supp. 1976); Ur
CODE ArN. § 77-24-16 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169
(1975); WAsHr. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.76.070 (1961); W. VA. CODE Amx. 27-6A-4
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANm. §971.17 (1971) (amended Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT.
Azx. §25-75 (1967). See also ALI MODEL P=AL CODE §4.08 (1962 Proposed
Official Draft).
3 Because the duty to consult the court before releasing a patient attaches
principally to individuals who have been committed to mental hospitals through the
criminal process, this Comment will deal only with the liability of practitioners
treating patients who would still be in jail at the time of their release but for the
fact that they were sentenced to treatment in lieu of incarceration, were found
incompetent to stand trial, or were acquitted for reasons of mental disease. These
individuals (hereinafter referred to as "mentally ill offenders") represent a peculiar
subclass of those who are civilly committed. Once their penal sentences, which may
be in fact spent in mental hospitals, have expired, they must be afforded the same
precedural safeguards as those who are civilly committed. See Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
Although mentally ill offenders may be confined for an indeterminate length of
time, the Baxstrom decision divides their incarceration into two parts: (1) the period
when they would have been in jail but for confinement and treatment at a psychiatric facility, which might be called a "shadow sentence," and (2) the period after
the shadow sentence expires when the patients are subject to the procedures of civil
commitment. See Waite v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Because those
confined in civil commitment proceedings may generally be discharged without the
approval of the court of commitment, see Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally ll, 87 -Anv.L. REv. 1190, 1376-1398 (1974), the statutory
requirement that judicial approval be sought for the release of mentally ill offenders
should arguably extend only to releases effected during the shadow sentence. See
generally Greenwald, Disposition of the Insane Defendant After "Acquittal'-The
Long Road From Commitment to Release, 59 J. OF Cami. L.C. & P.S. 583 (1968).
It could be narrowly argued under Baxstrom, however, that a state may continue to
confine an individual as a mentally ill offender and that his release must be approved
by the court if the state can show that the patient "is so dangerously mentally ill"
as to warrant lasting incarceration in a facility for mentally ill offenders. 383 U.S.
at 115. In addition, the extension of civil commitment procedural safeguards to
mentally ill offenders whose shadow sentences have elapsed does not mean that a
state may not rationally distinguish between patients who were civilly committed
and may be discharged in a discretionary manner, and patients who have committed
a crime in the past and must be released by the court, albeit with procedural
safeguards. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 508 (1972). The best that
Baxstrom does for a mentally ill offender, therefore, is to guarantee him procedural
safeguards equivalent to those enjoyed by persons confined in civil commitment
proceedings; these safeguards would apply only after the expiration of the shadow
sentence. In effect, the narrower reading of Baxstrom serves to extend the duty to
consult the court before releasing a mentally ill offender past the expiration of the
shadow sentence.
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CASE: DEFINING A CAUSE OF ACTION

A. Modern Trends in the Treatment of the Mentally Ill
A precipitous decline in the mental hospital population of the
United States has ocurred during the past several years.4 This trend
has resulted from the theory that patients who no longer require
inpatient treatment may be released into the community.8 Many
mental patients participate in various forms of release programs,
including partial treatment programs established by the hospitals
that released them.6 The impetus for this trend comes from the
widespread belief that these programs are a successful means for
7
rehabilitating the mentally ill.

In time gone by, mental defectives were confined and kept
under constant surveillance. Medical and psychiatric advances, demonstrating the inadvisability of that system,
prompted the state to abandon it and adopt the modem
and therapeutically approved method of allowing the [mental defective] a freedom of action without close and continual watching.8
The implementation of these programs, however, has posed
some serious difficulties for psychotherapists who treat mentally ill
4 The decline in the nationwide mental hospital census from 560,000 in 1955
to 248,562 in 1973 is reported in Greenblatt & Glazier, The Phasing Out of Mental
Hospitals in the United States, 132 Am. J. PSYCH. 1135 (1975). Between 1970
and 1975, the two most populous states, California and New York, reported declines
in their mental hospital census from 30,000 to 7,000 and from 70,000 to 35,000,
respectively. Zitrin, Hardesty, Burdock & Drossman, Crime and Violence Among
Mental Patients, 133 Am. J. PsYcH. 142, 142 (1976).
5 Wolpert & Wolpert, The Relocation of Released Mental Hospital Patients Into
Residential Communities, 7 PoL'Y Scr. 31, 33 (1976). The importance of the trend
toward releasing mental patients is underscored in a somewhat negative fashion by
the observation that the mental hospital census is now distinguished not by longterm residence but by frequent rehospitalization and redischarges into the community. Greenblatt & Glazier, supra note 4, at 1136.
6 Greenblatt & Glazier, supra note 4; R. GLAsscorE & C. KANNO, GENErAL
HosprrAL PsYcHATRIc Uurrs 21 (1965).
7 The therapeutic value of release programs has been established by a number
of studies. For example, schizophrenic patients who underwent a brief dischargedirected treatment, succeeded by a systematic regimen of after-care, demonstrated
at least as much improvement as those who received routine hospitalization and
after-care; the two groups demonstrated the same recidivism rate. Caffey, Galbrecht,
& Klett, Brief Hospitalizationand After-Care in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 24
ARcr. GEN. PSYcH. 81, 84 (1971). Similarly, day patients resumed their jobs more
quicldy, showed less evidence of "manifest psychopathology" and demonstrated a
lower rate of recidivism than those who were released after being treated as
inpatients. Herz, Endicott, Spitzer, & Mesnikoff, Day Versus Inpatient Hospitalization: A Controlled Study, 127 Am. J. PsyCH. 1371, 1379 (1971).
8
Excelsior Ins. Co. v. State, 296 N.Y. 40, 46, 69 N.E.2d 553, 556 (1946).
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offenders eligible for release programs. As soon as a patient is freed,
an uncontrollable risk of harm arises. Even the utmost precautions
will not prevent the infliction of some harm by released patients,
unless such patients are under constant supervision and surveillance.
Such measures would undermine the very purpose of release programs.
These programs necessarily involve a degree of calculated risk
that cannot be controlled by the exercise of even the highest care
and therefore must be taken on balance. 9 Because the Semler case
illustrates the unique problems posed by release programs, a close
examination of the facts' 0 is necessary to understand the Fourth
Circuit's novel disposition of the case.
B. The FactualSetting of Semler
John Gilreath's case history is not an appealing one. In October
1971, he was arrested in Fairfax County for the abduction of Laurie
Newbold, another young woman from Madeira. This apparently
was not an isolated incident because Gilreath had been involved in
similar assaults upon young women on at least two other occasions."
Before he was tried for the Newbold abduction, Gilreath entered
the Psychiatric Institute of Washington D.C. for treatment under
the supervision of Dr. Ralph W. Wadeson, Jr.'2 Dr. Wadeson diagnosed Gilreath as "a latent schizophrenic characterized by bizarre
behavior, thought disorder and inability to articulate his thoughts
and feelings." 13 Gilreath's personality was also marked by aberrant
and aggressively sexual behavior, a disorder that the plaintiff later
termed "without a cure." '4 When Gilreath first came under his
care, however, Dr. Wadeson felt that the patient was not dangerous
as long as he was furnished with an environment of structured
therapy at the Psychiatric Institute. 5
In June of 1972, Dr. Wadeson met with Fairfax County Circuit
Court Judge William Plummer, who was hearing the Newbold abduction case. Dr. Wadeson explained the Psychiatric Institute's
9 Taig v. State, 19 App. Div. 2d 182, 183, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (1963).
10 The facts of the Semler case are set forth in 538 F.2d at 123-24. See text
accompanying notes 17-32 infra.
11 Brief for Appellee at 4.
2
3s
Gilreath previously had been treated by Dr. Fred Sabotka, who diagnosed
the patient as an "emotionally unstable personality with passive aggressive features"
and recommended close (i.e. 24-hour) treatment. Id.
131d. 4-5.
14 Id.

5.

15 538 F.2d at 123.
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methods to the judge and recommended a regimen of twenty-four
hour treatment for Gilreath. As a result of this conference with Dr.
Wadeson, Judge Plummer agreed to commit Gilreath to the Psychiatric Institute for extended therapy. In August of 1972, Gilreath
plead guilty to the charge of abduction and received a suspended
sentence of twenty years, conditioned upon continued treatment at
the Psychiatric Institute.16 The sentencing order stated in relevant
part that Gilreath was "to receive treatment at and remain confined
in the Psychiatric Institute until released by the Court." 17 Dr.
Wadeson, who agreed to be bound by this order,1 8 subsequently requested a clarification of its terms. This clarification and amplification of the sentencing order was supplied by Paul Folliard, Gilreath's probation officer, in a letter to Dr. Wadeson. Folliard's letter
purported to set forth Judge Plummer's understanding of the sentencing order:
Execution of sentence was suspended and [Gilreath] was
placed on probation for a period of twenty years with
special conditions that (1) he remain at the Psychiatric Institute until it is mutually agreed upon by the court
[Judge Plummer], you and the staff that John can be released and (2) he is to remain on the premises of the
hospital. 19
After seven months of intensive treatment, Dr. Wadeson permitted, and Judge Plummer approved, several holiday and over16Id. The precise nature of Gilreath's therapy did not come to light during
the Semler litigation.
17 Brief for Appellant Folliard at 10.
18 Dr. Wadeson apparently did not contest that he was bound by the sentencing
order, even though he was not technically a party to the order. Some doubt existed
in the plaintiff's mind whether the Virginia court had the power to bring Dr.
Wadeson and the Psychiatric Institute under its jurisdiction because of their status
as Washington, D.C. residents. See Brief for Appellee at 20. Because Dr. Wadeson
did not dispute this point, the Fourth Circuit treated him as bound by the sentencing
order in Semler; consequently, this Comment will do likewise. See 538 F.2d at
124-25.
19 Brief for Appellant Folliard at 11-12. A problem is raised by the vagueness
of the court order, even as "clarified" by Folliard's letter, because it did not state
explicitly who it intended to protect. The negligence per se analysis used in
Semler requires that the class in whose favor a statute or a court order runs be
defined in order to determine which plaintiffs can sue when a breach occurs. See
text accompanying notes 54 & 66. The order could have been construed to protect
Gilreath and thus to limit the psychiatrist's obligations under the order to Gilreath
exclusively. This interpretation of the sentencing order would have been consistent
with the requirements of treatment, and perhaps even confinement, if Gilreath were
dangerous only to himself. The Semler court rejected this possibility, choosing
instead to define the class of persons protected by the order as "the public, particularly young girls." 538 F.2d at 124. In view of Gilreath's case history, the
court's interpretation is perfectly reasonable; nevertheless, Dr. Wadeson may have
been completely unaware that he had a legal obligation to the public.
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night passes for Gilreath. By February of 1973, the judge had
authorized Folliard to issue weekend passes at his discretion. In
May 1973, Dr. Wadeson recommended that Gilreath be transferred
from close confinement to a day patient status, where Gilreath
would remain in a therapeutic environment from eight o'clock in
the morning until five in the afternoon; evenings and weekends
were to be spent under his parents' supervision. This recommendation was approved by Judge Plummer without any hearing
or testimony from Dr. Wadeson or Folliard.2 0
After discussions with Dr. Wadeson, Folliard issued extended
passes to Gilreath in July and September of 1973 for the purpose of
investigating a move to Ohio. These passes were not submitted to
Judge Plummer for approval. When the Ohio probation authorities rejected his application for a transfer, Gilreath returned to
Virginia, but he was not restored to his former status as a day
patient. Instead, Gilreath was enrolled by Dr. Wadeson as an outpatient in a semi-weekly therapy group. During this time, Gilreath
lived first with his parents and then by himself; this change, however, was not reported to Judge Plummer. Two months later, on
October 29, 1973, Gilreath killed Natalia Semler; almost two years
had elapsed since Gilreath's arrest for abduction, with sixteen
21
months of that time spent under the care of Dr. Wadeson.
C. The District and the Circuit Court Opinions
Natalia's mother instituted a diversity suit in the Eastern District of Virginia, naming Dr. Wadeson and the Psychiatric Institute
as defendants; these defendants in turn impleaded Folliard. District Judge Albert Bryan, sitting without a jury, decided in favor
22
of the plaintiff and handed down an extraordinary opinion.
Judge Bryan expressly found that the psychiatrist had committed
no malpractice because the evidence did not establish that Dr.
Wadeson's actions violated "a standard acceptable in this or similar
communities." 23 Nevertheless, Judge Bryan reasoned that this suit
presented more than a malpractice issue due to the existence of the
sentencing order. He concluded that the mere violation of Judge
Plummer's sentencing order, irrespective of any negligence, gave
rise to a civil cause of action. Judge Bryan then added that the
20 538 F.2d at 123; Brief for Appellant Folliard at 13.

21 538 F.2d at 123-24.
22 Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., No. 99-74-A (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 1974), aff'd, 538
F.2d 121 (4th Cir.),_ cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
231d.

1.
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violation of the sentencing order in this case did constitute an act
of negligence.
Although .

.

. it is no excuse to show that due care was

exercised, I think that here there is negligence, and that
negligence is the failure to get Judge Plummer's approval
before changing the custodial status of Gilreath from that
of "day-care" to "discharge" or from "day-care" to that of
"out-patient." 24
Judge Bryan ultimately held for the plaintiff, and the defendants
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
No prior Virginia case had dealt with a claim that the breach of
a court order creates a civil cause of action. Thus, in dealing with
this case of first impression, the Fourth Circuit applied general
principles of the Virginia law of torts: 25 "To constitute actionable
negligence there must be a duty, a violation thereof, and a consequent injury. An accident which is not reasonably to be foreseen
by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence is not sufficient
ground for a negligence action." 26 Considering each of the elements
separately, the court first found that the sentencing order "imposed
a duty on the appellants to protect the public from the reasonably
foreseeable risk of harm at Gilreath's hands that the state judge had
already recognized." 2 7 Turning to the second element of actionable
negligence, the court found that the defendants had "breached the
duty imposed on them by the order of probation when they failed
to seek the trial judge's permission to transfer Gilreath to out24 Id. The district court's opinion is a farrago of conflicting theories of liability. The district court's conclusion that the violation of the court order was
actionable irrespective of negligence but that negligence was present in the failure
to comply with the court order is both redundant and contradictory. A breach of a

court order may indeed constitute negligence, but negligence cannot exist in the
presence of the exercise of due care. If tort liability is imposed for this breach,
then it can be recognized only under a theory of negligence per se, which in this
situation is tantamount to the application of a strict liability theory. See text
accompanying notes 78-87 infra. Perhaps the overt application of strict liability
principles to this case seemed too harsh to the district court; yet the imposition of
liability in the absence of negligence is by its own terms strict liability. In any
case, the district court's opinion cited no authority to support the proposition that
the breach of a court order constitutes actionable negligence.
25 538 F.2d at 124.
26Id. (quoting Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 780, 66 S.E.2d

441, 443 (1951)).
27538 F.2d at 125. The court felt that the purpose of protecting the public
was disclosed by the Virginia court orders requirement of confinement. Id. 124.
The Fourth Circuit bolstered this conclusion by quoting Wadeson's testimony to the

effect that Judge Plummer expressed "concern for the citizens of Fairfax County."
Id. 125 n.2. However, Dr. Wadeson also testified that Judge Plummer "was concerned for John [Gilreath]." Id.
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patient status." 28 In dealing with the "consequent injury" requirement for the finding of actionable negligence, the court addressed the issue of proximate cause 29 and held that the breach of
the court order was a proximate cause of Natalia Semler's death.30
In affirming the district court's judgment for the plaintiff, the
Fourth Circuit adopted the lower court's finding of no malpractice; 31 nevertheless, it based its finding of defendants' liability upon
their failure to meet the "standard of reasonable care" con32
templated by the court order.
D. Analysis
By issuing his order sentencing John Gilreath to treatment and
confinement at the Psychiatric Institute, Judge Plummer became
the final arbiter of Gilreath's fate. Judge Plummer clearly anticipated exercising a significant degree of control with respect to even
the smallest decisions about Gilreath's therapy and gradual ac28 Id. 126. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, in view of the court orders
requirement of approval by the judge, the decision to change Gilreath's status could
not be a purely medical one; furthermore, by failing to obtain judicial approval for
Gilreath's release as an outpatient, Dr. Wadeson and Folliard had substituted their
judgment for Judge Plummer's in violation of the sentencing order. Id. 125.
20Id. 126. The Fourth Circuit failed to consider the issue of cause-in-fact
even though the cause-in-fact of the harm must be established before the question
of proximate cause is reached. See W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS 236-44 (4th ed.
1971). The change in Gilreath's status from day patient to outpatient was arguably
not the cause-in-fact of Natalia Semler's death in the sense that it might have
occurred even if Gilreath's status had remained unchanged. Gilreath had opportunities to commit the crime as a day patient because he was no longer in the
custody of the Psychiatric Institute after five o'clock in the afternoon. The district
court dealt with this objection by asserting that the medication and therapy received
by Gilreath as a day patient "would carry over during his periods away from the
Institute . . . " No. 99-74-A, slip op. at 2-3. Furthermore, even if the crime
had been committed at a time when Gilreath would have been confined or in the
therapy environment but for the switch from day patient to outpatient, it is not
clear that Judge Plummer would not have approved such a transfer. The Fourth
Circuit responded to this problem, however, by asserting that it was "reasonable to
infer from the proven facts that the judge would not have granted his permission."
538 F.2d at 126.
30 538 F.2d at 126-27.

31Id. 125.
.32 Id.
More precisely, the court order specified a standard of behavior rather
than a standard of care. The finding of no malpractice implied that the doctors
exercised reasonable care in treating and releasing Gilreath; however, the court order
went beyond the delineation of a standard of care to prescribe certain procedures
with which the doctor and the probation officer had to comply. This imposed a
weightier obligation on Dr. Wadeson and Folliard than the more flexible standard
of reasonable care under the common law. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
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climatization to society. 83 The Virginia judge explicitly delegated
34
to Folliard the discretion only to issue weekend passes to Gilreath.
Judge Plummer's sentencing order set forth three affirmative
duties on Dr. Wadeson's part. Two of these duties, the duty to
treat and the duty to confine, were explicitly set forth in the order.
The third duty, that of obtaining the court's approval for any
changes in Gilreath's status, arose from the phrase in the order that
Gilreath was to remain confined "until released by the Court." 35
Although this third duty resembles an obligation owed to the
court itself rather than to Natalia Semler, the Fourth Circuit
asserted that the sentencing order created a special relationship between Gilreath and his psychiatrist that required the psychiatrist to
consult the court before releasing Gilreath as an outpatient. The
duties to confine and to consult the court became the crux of the
obligation Dr. Wadeson owed to Natalia Semler.36 Therefore, the
obligations set forth in Judge Plummer's court order can reasonably
be analyzed as an embodiment of two analogous common law duties:
the duty to control a dangerous person, and the duty to warn
potential victims of a patient's harmfulness.
According to section 315 of the Second Restatement of Torts,
there is no duty to control a third party in order to prevent him
from physically harming another unless a "special relationship"
exists between the putative tortfeasor and the third party. 7 Section
319 states that such a special relationship exists, for example, when
an individual takes charge of a third party likely to cause harm if
not controlled. This individual is "under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing
such harm." 38 A person likely to cause harm is defined by the
Restatement as one "who has a peculiar tendency to act [injuriously]" of which the person charged with the duty is or should
be aware.3 9 The Semler court cited section 319 in asserting that
the court order put Dr. Wadeson in charge of Gilreath and thereby
33 Although this Comment argues that an independent panel of psychiatrists is
the appropriate body for deciding issues regarding mental patient treatment and
release, the fact remains that Judge Plummer did establish himself as the proper
forum for reviewing decisions concerning Gilreath's regimen of treatment. The
retention of jurisdiction by the committing court is unmistakably its prerogative in
the case of mentally ill offenders. See note 3 supra.
3 538 F.2d at 123.
35 Breffor

36
3

Appellant Folliard at 10.

See 538 F.2d at 124.

7_REsTATEmENT (SEcoND)

Id. § 319.
39 Id. § 319, Comment a.

38

oF TorTs § 315 (1965).
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imposed upon him the duty of confining Gilreath unless his release
was approved by Judge Plunmmer.40
Assuming that Gilreath had a "peculiar tendency to act injuriously" within the definition of section 319, the standard of care
imposed upon Dr. Wadeson included a common law duty of confinement. In the absence of a court order as in Semler, no unconditional duty to confine an individual who is likely to be dangerous
exists at common law. One who assumes custody of a dangerous
person has a duty only to exercise ordinary care in supervising such
a person, taking into consideration his potentially dangerous characteristics 1 No evidence was introduced in Semler to indicate
that Dr. Wadeson had not exercised ordinary care in supervising
and confining Gilreath. Instead, the district court found no malpractice on Dr. Wadeson's part in that the decision to release
Gilreath as an outpatient was not itself negligent except for the
fact that it violated the provisions of the sentencing order.4
Absent the court order, even the underlying assumption that a
duty to restrain Gilreath attached to Dr. Wadeson at all is questionable because the presence of this obligation turns on the asserted
"dangerous propensities" of the patient. 43 The imposition of
liability frequently requires that hospital authorities have knowledge
that a patient has violent tendencies or has recently assaulted
others. 4 No evidence was introduced in Semler that Gilreath had
demonstrated violent behavior while under treatment at the Psychiatric Institute. His improvement appeared to be steady; Dr. Wadeson himself, in a letter to Judge Plummer recommending greater
freedom outside the hospital for the patient, indicated that Gilreath
was "not a danger to himself or to others." 45 Judge Plummer
40538 F.2d at 125.
41 Smart v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 907, 909 (W.D. Okla.) (dictum),
aff'd, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953); Weis v. State, 267 App. Div. 233, 45
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1943).
42 See note 24 supra.
43 See REsrATEmENT (SEcowD)
44

or

TORTS

§ 319 (1965).

See Jones v. United States, 399 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1968) (a mental patient
threw an attendant out of a moving ambulance after having attacked other attendants
prior to the trip); Homere v. State, 79 Misc. 2d 972, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Ct. CL
1974), af'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975) (a mental patient was
released pursuant to a panel of psychiatrists' recommendation even though a violent
incident occurred shortly after such recommendation). See also Jones v. State, 267
App. Div. 254, 45 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1943); Weils v. State, 267 App. Div. 233, 45
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1943). But cf. Johnson v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D.
Fla. 1976) (no negligence in the failure of therapists to restrict to post army
sergeant who had previously threatened his wife and brother-in-law and had exhibited erratic behavior, because of medical judgment that the symptoms were in
remission).
45 Brief for Appellant Folliard at 5.
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approved all of the doctor's requests to increase Gilreath's freedom.
In proposing a transfer from close treatment to day patient status, Dr.
Wadeson reported that there had been "no evidence of any breakthrough of [Gilreath's] aggressive or sexual impulses" while on
weekend passes. 46 Therefore, had Dr. WVadeson not been under a
court order to confine Gilreath, no basis for imposing an absolute
duty to restrain Gilreath would exist.
A similar analysis applies to the duty to inform the court and
obtain its approval before changing Gilreath's status. This obligation may be analogized to the emerging notion that the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect threatened victims may require
the therapist to warn the endangered party. 47 The duty to warn
requires not only warnings to individuals who have been threatened
but also transmission of an adequate record of the patient's behavior to other therapists who should be informed of the patient's
dangerous proclivities.48 Because Gilreath did not know Natalia

46 Id. 6. Plaintiff disputed the value of any improvement on Gilreath's part,
characterizing his illness as incurable. Brief for Appellee at 5. See also CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1026, 1026.1 (West Supp. 1977) (amending CAL. PE.L CODE § 1026
(West 1970)). Although the California statutory scheme requires only a showing
that a mental patient no longer be a "danger to the health and safety of others"
before he can be released on probation as an outpatient, the mental health director
of the county or his designee must convince the committing court that the patient
has recovered his sanity before a patient can be released unconditionally. See note
75 infra. One California court has interpreted this requirement to mean that the
patient has not merely recovered from the state of "not knowing right from wrong"
experienced at the time of the crime, but has been fully restored to sanity. People
But see
v. Mallory, 254 Cal. App. 2d 151, 156, 61 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (1967).
In re Jones, 260 Cal. App. 2d 906, 68 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1968).
47

Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In Tarasoff, psychotherapists failed to warn a young woman
that during therapeutic sessions a patient had confided his intention to kill her.
Subsequently, the patient murdered the young woman. Cf. Johnson v. State, 69
Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (there is a duty to warn
parents of the homicidal tendencies of their foster child when these proclivities are
not readily detectable by the parents). See also Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288
(5th Cir. 1956); Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp.
409 (D.N.D. 1967).
The dissent in Tarasoff raised the possibility that the imposition on psychotherapists of a duty to warn would breach the bond of confidentiality between the
therapist and his patient. The breakdown of trust that is engendered by a breach
of the bond of confidentiality would, the Tarasoff dissent predicted, lead to an
increase in violent behavior on the part of mental patients. 17 Cal. 3d at 462, 551
P.2d at 361, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (Clark J., dissenting). See also Stone, The
Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HAIv. L. Rzv.
358 (1976).
48 See Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Greenberg
v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971); cf. Hicks v. United States, 511
F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (duty to warn the court of danger to threatened victim).
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Semler and had never threatened her, Dr. Wadeson had no duty to
warn her of Gilreath's impending change to outpatient status. In
light of the fact that Judge Plummer ordered the doctor to consult
him before changing Gilreath's status, the doctor's duty to warn
extended to the judge as a surrogate for potential victims. 49 In this
sense, Dr. Wadeson arguably breached the duty to warn, as specified
in Judge Plummer's sentencing order, when he released Gilreath
without obtaining the court's approval.
In the absence of a court order, the obligation to warn, like
the duty to confine, exists only if a patient has exhibited violent
behavior in the past that must be communicated to the appropriate individual, or has threatened the person to be warned. 10 No
evidence was adduced indicating that Gilreath had recently threatened anyone. More importantly, no evidence existed to show that
Dr. Wadeson failed to make complete reports to the Fairfax County
Circuit Court with respect to Gilreath's mental condition. Judge
Plummer's willingness to extend progressively greater degrees of
freedom to Gilreath demonstrated the judge's confidence in the
completeness of the record before him.51 Thus, in the absence of
the court order, Dr. Wadeson's failure to warn could not support a
finding of negligence.
The existence of the Virginia state court's sentencing order was
essential to the Semler result because the order supplied the only
ground for a finding of negligence on Dr. Wadeson's part. The
Fourth Circuit held that the sentencing order set down an absolute
standard of behavior for Dr. Wadeson and that any deviation from
this standard, however reasonable, would suffice as a violation of
the court order, thereby justifying a finding of negligence. As the
Semler court stated: "[The] standard [of reasonable care] has been
delineated by the precise language of the court order. The appellants were to retain custody over Gilreath until he was released
from the Institute by order of the court. No lesser measure of care
would suffice." 52 This ruling effectively applied a standard of
negligence per se.
49 See No. 99-74-A, slip op. at 2.
50 Cf. CAL. EvD. CODE § 1024 (West 1966) (indicating that the psychiatristpatient privilege of confidentiality ceases only when the therapist has reason to
believe that his patient is dangerous to himself or another and that disclosure of
the communication is necessary to prevent the danger).
51
See Brief for Appellant Folliard at 10-13.

52 538 F.2d at 125.
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II. THE FAILURE TO OBTAIN JUDICIAL APPROVAL FOR THE
RELEASE OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS

A. The Theory of Negligence Per Se
Negligence per se is a shorthand term 53 for the judicial rule
that a statutory violation may be the basis for a civil cause of action
when the injured party is a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted, when the harm resulting from the violation
is of the type contemplated by the statute,5 4 and when the statutory
breach is a proximate cause of the injury. 55 The justifications for
the theory of negligence per se vary greatly. 56 For example, one
view suggests that violations of statutes may be so socially undesirable that they should be penalized by civil as well as criminal liability.57 Another rationale for the theory of negligence per se declares
that the violation of a statute imprints the stamp of culpability upon
the offender and therefore colors the injury produced by the breach
as negligent.5 8 A third view argues that in extracting a standard of
care from the experience of the community, statutory pronouncements provide a formulated standard of universal wrongfulness for
the courts to apply.5 9 Despite the disparate nature of these various
rationales, they all rely upon a basic notion: the judgment of the
legislature has sufficient legitimacy to justify the presumption that
any action contrary to a legislative enactment necessarily warrants
53W. TossEn, LAw OF TonRTs 200 (4th ed. 1971).

54 E.g., Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
55 E.g., Shafer v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 335 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.

1964).

56W. PNossmi, LAw oF TORTS 191-92 (4th ed. 1971).
57
See Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Mnaw. L.
Ev. 361, 370 (1932). Under this view, civil liability serves to buttress legislative
policies by adding another disincentive to the contravention of the legislature's goals.
Otto v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1240, 1244 (N.D. Miss. 1974). The logic
of this argument, however, is not compelling because the criminal penalty is presumably geared to punish the undesirable activity sufficiently to act as a deterrent
in and of itself. Tort judgments may have a deterrent effect, but the purposes of
tort liability go beyond a consideration of the disincentives needed to deter a
defendant from undesirable activity; tort judgments are normally designed to compensate injured parties for their losses. The compensatory function may result in a
judgment that has nothing to do with the amount needed to deter a defendant from
his undesirable actions. See Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort
Liability, 46 HAnv. L. REv. 453, 474-75 (1933).
58 See Lowndes, supra note 57, at 371. See also Richardson v. Gregory, 281
F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This rationale, however, still does not explain why
criminal sanctions are insuffcient to punish a defendant's "culpability."
59'Cinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943); Platt v
Southern Photo Material Co., 4 Ga. App. 159, 163, 60 S.E. 1068, 1070 (1908).
Judge Traynor, however, warned in Clinkscales that the theory of negligence per se
should not be applied when it serves to impose liability without fault. 22 Cal. 2d
at 75, 136 P.2d at 778.
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the imposition of tort liability upon the actor. A comparison of
court orders and statutes is relevant to the question whether violations of court orders should serve as a basis for tort liability.
Statutes are often accepted as appropriate criteria of negligence
partly because many courts assume that a statute "harnesses the
technical knowledge that may have gone into [its] formulation." 60
Legislatures are able to hold hearings that permit a wide variety of
interested parties to testify. The legislature's facilities for investigation are likely to be superior to those of a court because the judge
must rely solely upon evidence presented to him by two parties who
desire a resolution on the merits of a particular conflict.61 The
broad range of interests and points of view that are represented in
a legislature are absent in the courtroom, where the focus is not on
the universality of application implied by a statute but rather on
the particularity of the facts presented to the court. As a standard
of negligence, a statute may be said to embody the experience of
the community, whereas a court order represents the judgment of
one individual with a narrow set of facts before him.
Nevertheless, a court order may have the same legitimacy as a
statute and thereby serve to establish a standard of care. Courts
traditionally make decisions concerning what is reasonable under
the law of torts, and these decisions have the broad effect of proscribing certain kinds of behavior that have been deemed negligent.
By definition, the standard of the ordinarily prudent man must reflect a community's experience; judges are presumably well versed
in ascertaining and applying such a standard. A court order
arguably has sufficient legitimacy to justify a finding of negligence
per se if it is breached.
B. The Semler Model: Application of Negligence Per Se
The Semler court did not discuss the case in terms of the
theory of negligence per se, nor did it explain why this theory
should be extended to encompass violations of court orders. In
fact, the Semler court failed to justify its analysis with any policy or
theoretical arguments. The court simply treated the violation of
the court order as if it were applying the traditional theory of
negligence per se.
0

oMorris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions,
REv. 143, 144 (1949).
61 See Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 555, 324 S.W2d 201, 204 (1959);
Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLum. L. REV.
21 (1949); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48
CoLum. L. REV. 456 (1948).

28 TEx. L.
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The standard of care that would usually attach to Dr. Wadeson
in his treatment of a patient is that of the normally prudent psychiatrist exercising the same degree of skill as similarly situated practitioners. 62 Under the Semler court's analysis, however, Judge
Plummer's order established a higher standard of care. The sentencing order removed a large degree of discretion from Dr. Wadeson, prescribing a standard of conduct 63 that largely foreclosed the
psychiatrist's independent judgment. In effect, the Fourth Circuit
considered only whether Dr. Wadeson breached the court order's
literal terms, thereby foreclosing any further evaluation of the
64
reasonableness of the doctor's conduct.
The Semler court then proceeded to the next step in a negligence per se type of analysis. Under this theory, a showing that a
defendant breached a statute or a court order is insufficient. A
plaintiff must also show that the statute or court order in question
explicitly or implicitly gives him a cause of action.0 Because the
court order did not explicitly give a cause of action to an injured
person, the Fourth Circuit had to determine whether one arose by
implication. Whether a cause of action should be implied "depends, at least in great measure, upon whether the duty is imposed
for the special benefit of a particular group or class of persons." 66
62

E.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
63 It is not always easy to determine whether a [statute] establishes a
standard of care or a standard of conduct. I am persuaded that if the
statute leaves a person [room] to exercise his judgment such as, he may
proceed when it is safe to do so, then the statute establishes a standard of
care. However, if the statute provides that all persons shall stop in obedience to the red flashing light facing them at an intersection, it is one that
leaves no discretion, nor does it leave an exercise of judgment on the part
of the driver, and is therefore a standard of conduct statute.
Sheppard v. Judkins, 476 S.W.2d 102, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (Ray, J., concurring). See also Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200
N.E. 824 (1936).
64 See Morris, supra note 57, at 455; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action,
27 HAv. L. RBv. 317, 325-26 (1914).
65 Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936).
A statute "creates" no liability unless it discloses an intention express or
implied that from disregard of a statutory command a liability for resultant
damages shall arise "which would not exist but for the statute." . . . The
statute may in express terms give to an injured person a cause of action for
such damages. Difficulty arises only where the statute does not, in express
terms, make any provision for such a cause of action. Then the problem is
whether such a provision should be implied.
Id. at 305, 200 N.E. at 829 (quoting Shepard Co. v. Zachary P. Taylor Pub. Co.,
234 N.Y. 465, 468, 138 N.E. 409, 410 (1923)).
66 Id. at 305, 200 N.E. at 829.
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The Semler court had little difficulty with this requirement,
asserting:
The order itself discloses that the state trial judge had a
dual purpose in placing Gilreath on probation. The
judge's willingness to allow Gilreath to continue his
private psychiatric treatment shows concern for his welfare. At the same time, the requirement of confinement
until release by the court was to protect the public, particularly young girls, from the foreseeable risk of attack. 67
Under the court's reasoning, a doctor who relies solely upon his own
judgment and non-negligently releases a mentally ill offender without judicial approval becomes liable to the outside public for harm
committed by that patient.68 This reasoning poses problems by
establishing competing interests that must be reconciled.
C. Problems Raised by the Semler Model
Although the violation of Judge Plummer's order provided the
Semler court with the basis for a somewhat unconventional application of the theory of negligence per se, a more traditional approach
is possible in those states where statutes require a treating psychiatrist to seek judicial approval for the release of a mentally ill
offender.6 9 Yet even under a more traditional negligence per se
67 538 F.2d at 124. The Senler court supported its conclusion that Judge
Plummer had issued the sentencing order for the protection "of the public" by
quoting from Dr. Wadeson's testimony: "Yes, [the judge] was very interested in the
case. He seemed to have a thorough knowledge of John's situation, his past, his
problems. He was concerned for the citizens of Fairfax County. He was concerned
for John." Id. 125 n.2.
By the same token, the California courts have held that § 1026 of the Penal
Code, which provides that mentally ill offenders are to be released only pursuant to
the court of commitments approval, is intended for the primary purpose of protecting the public. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 255,
379 P.2d 22, 25, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723 (1963) (en bane); accord, People v.
Mallory, 254 Cal. App. 2d 151, 61 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1967). See note 75 infra.
Nevertheless, the words of the sentencing order are at least equally susceptible to a
conclusion that the order was designed to protect Gilreath rather than the public
at large. The requirement that Gilreath was to remain confined may have been
imposed to protect him from committing acts of violence or from having violence
wreaked upon him because the court felt that Gilreath himself was especially vulnerable. See REsTAsTEMEr (SxcoND) OF ToaTs §324 (1965); Zitrin, Hardesty,
Burdock & Drossman, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients, 133 Am. J.
Psycir. 142 (1976). The obligation imposed on Dr. Wadeson to consult the court
before changing Gilreath's status could be construed simply as a desire to monitor
his therapy in order to insure that Gilreath was receiving proper treatment.
Gs See Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955); Jones v. State,
267 App. Div. 254, 45 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1943); Note, Liability of Mental Hospitals
for Acts of Their Patients Under the Open Door Policy, 57 VA. L. REv. 156 (1971).
69
Virginia enacted a statute requiring judicial approval for the release of mentally ill offenders. VA. CODE ArNi. § 19.1-239 (Supp. 1960) as amended by 1966
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analysis, the release of the mentally ill offender presents difficulties.
For example, many of these statutes do not specify what is meant
by the "release" of mentally ill offenders.7 0 Cases may arise where
a treating psychiatrist reasonably decides to shift a person from
twenty-four hour confinement to some status of limited freedom
without consulting the court. In these circumstances, the patient
is still under partial confinement; therefore, the treating psychiatrist
may not believe that judicial approval for the release is necessary
under the statute. If the patient subsequently harms a member of
the public and courts read the word "release" broadly, then the
breach of the statute may become actionable under the reasoning
of Semler, notwithstanding the doctor's exercise of due care. The
clear implication of this result is that psychiatrists could avoid the
imposition of liability by seeking a court's approval for a broad
range of release plans. After Semler, cautious psychiatrists who are
under a statutory or judicial obligation to seek court approval for
the release of a mentally ill offender are not likely to free the
patient until they have submitted their plans to the court.7 ' Judges
may be besieged by requests to approve various forms of release,
even those as minor as a day trip to the zoo. Moreover, as court
orders and statutes are drawn more broadly to require judicial apVa. Acts ch. 659 and 1968 Va. Acts ch. 657 (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-181 (Supp. 1977)). The district court, which applied Virginia law, therefore
could have relied upon a negligence per se analysis that arises from a statutory
violation.
70The New York statute is fairly typical in this respect: "If the court is satisfied
that the committed person may be discharged or released on condition without
danger to himself or others, the court must order his discharge, or his release on
such conditions as the court determines to be necessary." N.Y. Cnm. Pao. LA-w
§ 330.20(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976). "Released on condition" is nowhere defined.
Presumably, the "on condition language might be fleshed out by a court order
pursuant to the statute; however, this solution assumes that a release warranting
judicial approval has occurred in the first place, thereby affording a judge an opportunity to specify prospectively what "on condition"' means for the particular patient
before him. At least the New York statute puts a treating psychiatrist on notice of
the requirement to obtain judicial approval for programs that are arguably conditional releases. The cryptic language of the corresponding statutes of other states
provides little guidance for a treating psychiatrist to determine whether a change in
a patient's treatment routine requires court approval. E.g., Wyo. STAT. § 25-75
(1967) ("No patient held on order of a court having criminal jurisdiction in any
action or proceeding arising out of a criminal offense shall be discharged except
upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction").
71 This possibility is not as extreme as it may appear. Rhode Island, for example, requires that "[a] person committed under this subdivision (providing for the
treatment of committed offenders) shall not be paroled, furloughed, placed on outpatient status or released from a locked facility or otherwise released from the instiR.I. GEm.
tution where he is being treated except upon petition to the court ......
LAws ANN. § 26-4-4(e) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis supplied). As noted earlier, a
broadly worded statute could be construed to require judicial approval for any
release "from a locked facility." See notes 70 supra, 75 infra, & accompanying text.

1977]

PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' LIABILITY

proval for more forms of release, this problem becomes more acute.
Consequently, the court would become deeply enmeshed in the
time-consuming and frustrating task of reviewing decisions that are
essentially the product of professional expertise.72 To require judicial approval of day-to-day decisions about the regimen of therapy
afforded to mentally ill offenders would substantially burden a
psychiatrist's exercise of discretion and might stifle any degree of
inventiveness that is directed toward structuring controlled release
programs. In fact, psychiatrists might stop releasing patients altogether, rather than submit themselves to such a degree of judicial
scrutiny.
The problem of undue judicial interference in psychiatric
decisionmaking could be alleviated by drafting statutes or court
orders that specify in greater detail which kinds of release programs
must be approved by the court. Greater specificity, however, makes
it more difficult to accommodate two additional interests that are
essentially contradictory: the rehabilitation of mentally ill offenders
through progressively greater freedom, and the protection of the
public from bodily assault. 73 These purposes are not contradictory
in the sense that most, or even many, released patients will necessarily harm members of the community. Nevertheless, as soon as
any patients are released, some risk of harm arises. 74 Statutes and
court orders can only cover a limited number of situations. Persons
harmed by patients in situations that fall outside the strictly defined
ambit of a narrow court order or statute will not have the theory of
negligence per se available to them. Although these plaintiffs may
have other means of proving negligence, the crux of the Semler
case is that the plaintiff was able to recover even in the absence of
negligence because the court held that the violation of Judge Plummer's sentencing order was in and of itself actionable. Unlike the
Semler plaintiff, members of the public who are injured by nonnegligently released patients may not be able to recover unless they
can rely on the theory of negligence per se. In order for a victim
to rely on such a theory, however, he must show that the psycho72 It would be an understatement to say that the psychiatric profession has
resented judicial handling of psychiatric issues. See, e.g., Suarez, Psychiatry and the
Criminal Law System, 129 Am. J. PsycH. 293 (1972). On the other hand, judicial
intervention in issues concerning the treatment of the mentally ill may be related
to abuses that occurred when the psychiatric profession was not monitored. See,
e.g., Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734, 740-46 (1969).
73 See Excelsior Ins. Co. v. State, 296 N.Y. 40, 46, 69 N.E.2d 553, 556 (1946);
Note, Liability of Mental Hospitals for Acts of Their Patients Under the Open Door
Policy, 57 VA. L. REv. 156 (1971).
74 See text accompanying note 96 infra.
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therapist in question failed to obey a specific statutory mandate or
court order; without the occurrence of such a violation, a victim
would be foreclosed from recovery."
The negligence per se approach creates a direct conflict between
the desire to compensate individuals injured by released mental
patients and the desire to avoid the institutional strains caused by
judicial review of highly technical psychiatric decisions. An irregular and unpredictable pattern of recovery is likely to emerge
from this struggle because courts will strive to avoid the equally
undesirable results of denying recovery to an injured plaintiff or
of undertaking a detailed review of psychiatric decisionmaking.
The problems generated by the Semler model-the strains upon
judicial resources, the deterrence of release as a technique of re7

5 An examination of the California approach to this problem illustrates that
some serious difficulties arise even with a detailed statutory scheme for the release
of a mentally ill offender. The California approach employs different statutory
provisions for unconditional release and for conditional release as an outpatient. The
procedure for both is the same: before the county mental health director or his
designee, presumably the treating psychiatrist, can release a mentally ill offender

either unconditionally or as an outpatient, the court of commitment must be notified.
CAL. PEN.L CODE § 1026a (West Supp. 1977) (unconditional release); CA.
_. AL
CoDE § 1026.1(a) (West Supp. 1977) (release as an outpatient). Judicial approval
is also required when an outpatient is transferred back to close treatment or when
the county prosecutor challenges the outpatient status of a previously released
individual.

CAL.

PNA.L

CODE

§§ 1026.1(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1977).

In the case of a proposed release as an outpatient, § 1026.1 explains that, after
being notified, the court may hold a hearing and approve or disapprove of the plan.
If no action is taken by the court, the plan is considered approved. This section
explains further that the decision to release a mentally ill offender as an outpatient
must turn on whether the county mental health director or his designee is convinced
that the patient is "not a danger to the health and safety of others."
Section 1026a requires that before a mentally ill offender can be released unconditionally, he must "have been confined or placed on outpatient treatment for a
period of not less than 90 days from the date of the order of confinement." Only
then may the patient or the superintendent of the hospital or other facility in which
he is confined petition the court of commitment for a hearing to determine whether
the patient's "sanity has been restored," a condition that is the prerequisite for
absolute release.
Section 1026.1 does not define what is meant by "outpatient treatment." As a
result, even though the California statute places psychiatrists on notice of their
obligations to a greater extent than many other state statutes that deal with the
release of mentally ill offenders, serious problems remain. As an illustration, suppose that a treating psychiatrist in California makes a reasonably prudent decision
to place a mentally ill offender in a "half-way" house, where the patient remains
under the supervision of trained personnel but is somewhat free to come and go as
he pleases. Whether this is a form of "outpatient treatment" that requires judicial
approval or whether the patient is still under confinement remains unanswered.
This problem is exacerbated in a state with less detailed statutes than California.
Suppose that a psychiatrist in such a state sends a patient, accompanied by supervisory personnel, on a day trip to the zoo. Although this trip is off the hospital's
premises, it is constructively within the psychiatrist's control. Must the psychiatrist
ask the approval of the court of commitment for this "release?" If the patient
assaults a passerby strolling through the zoo, despite the exercise of care by the
supervisory personnel, is the psychiatrist liable under a theory of negligence per se
for releasing the patient without the court's approval?
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habilitation, and the uncertain pattern of recovery by victims-are
by no means insubstantial. These problems are caused by the inability of the negligence per se model to reconcile the three interests
mentioned above under either broadly or narrowly drawn court
orders and statutes. The negligence per se theory employed in
Semler may be viewed as a mechanism of imposing liability without
fault upon the psychiatrists. 7 After explaining this concept, this
Comment will explore the relative merits of directly applying a
strict liability theory in this context as a viable alternative to the
Semler approach.
III. ExPANSION

OF STRICT LIABILITY THEORY TO THE

RELEASE OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS

A. Imposition of Liability Without Fault by the
Application of the Negligence Per Se Theory
Although the justifications for applying the theory of negligence per se 7 do not reveal how this theory is often tantamount
to the application of strict liability principles, some authorities have
recognized that in certain cases the theory of strict liability underlies
the concept of negligence per se.78 The court will ordinarily weigh
the reasonableness of a physician's action in light of the classic negligence formula set down by Judge Learned Hand in United States
76 Certain courts, however, have indicated that a higher standard of care might
be applicable to those who treat and release the mentally ill. In Eanes v. United
States, 407 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit cautioned:
[I]t is incumbent upon the attendant experts who are in charge of the
mentally ill to exercise that degree of care, in diagnosing the illness of a
patient and in calculating the possibilities that his assaultive tendencies may
assert themselves, which is commensurate with the risks involved in opening
the doors of the hospital to him for leaves of absence during which he will
be free of professional care, supervision or restraint.
Id. 824 (emphasis supplied). The language in Eanes might have been influenced by
the grave nature of the injury that occurred in the case; nevertheless, the court's
language suggests that psychiatrists who release mental patients are subject to a
higher standard than that of reasonable care. Cf. Weihs v. State, 267 App. Div.
233, 236, 45 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (1943) (the degree of care exercised by those
in charge of mental patients should be in proportion to the illness of such patients).
77 See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
78 See, e.g., Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence
Actions, 28 Tm. L. REv. 143, 149-50 (1949); Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 Mon. L. REv. 233 (1960). Several commentators
have also pointed out that another familiar tort principle, that of res ipsa loquitur,
often turns out to be the equivalent of strict liability. Ehrenzweig, Negligence
Without Fault, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1422, 1432-34 (1966); Note, Absolute Liability for
Dangerous Things, 61 HAv. L. REv. 515, 517-19 (1948); Comment, Absolute
Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine,
37 CAL.. L. REv. 269, 276 (1949). Traditional concepts like negligence per se and
res ipsa loquitur endure perhaps because on a superficial level they appear to be
less harsh than strict liability.
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-v. Carroll Towing Co.: 70 whether the burden of precautions ex,ceed the gravity of injury discounted by the probability of harm.8 0
Although in many cases the statute in question concerns conduct
that would be considered negligent even under the common law
standard of reasonableness, 8' a statutory pronouncement that prescribes the precautions a physician must take nevertheless defines
the standard of care conclusively because the legislature has declared its judgment concerning the means necessary to minimize the
risks involved in medical treatment.8 2 The legislative judgment
may entail precautionary measures that exceed those called for by
the common law; in fact, the theory of negligence per se would not
be of much use to a plaintiff unless it created a standard of care
that goes beyond the standard prescribed by the common law.8 3 A
plaintiff need only show that a defendant violated a statute giving
him a cause of action in order to make out a prima facie case of
negligence under a theory of negligence per se. A plaintiff is
thereby relieved of the burden of demonstrating a defendant's
failure to meet the elements of reasonableness under the common
law standard. As a result, a plaintiff has a greater probability of
victory under a theory of negligence per se than under the common
law reasonableness standard. 84
The absolute nature of a statutory duty engenders an inchoate
liability without regard to fault. Under the common law, an individual retains a measure of discretion in the kinds of precautions
he may take as long as he fulfills the requirement of reasonableness.
The theory of negligence per se, however, takes this exercise of
judgment out of the individual's hands by mandating that the
failure to comply with a particular precaution set forth in a statute
is negligent, irrespective of whether the individual took other
measures that would satisfy the common law reasonableness
standard.8 5 When a defendant's breach of a statute or a court order
79 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
SOld. 173.

S1 Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 555, 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959).

This

would be the case, for example, with a statute that proscribes driving at night without the use of headlights. However, the Rudes court, noting that certain violations
of criminal statutes are sometimes not considered negligent under the "ordinarily
prudent man test," implied that negligence per se may approach strict liability. Id.
82 See Williams, supra note 78, at 236.
83 id. 254.
84 See text accompanying notes 89-91 infra.
8
5 See Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLTUM.
L. REv. 21 (1949). But see Hecht Co. v. McLaughlin, 214 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
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leaves him "in no position to meet the test of the prudent man," 86
a standard of liability without fault has been imposed. The violation of a statute "creates a liability per se" that approaches liability
87
without fault.

That negligence per se "approaches" liability without fault
does not imply an absolute equivalence between these two concepts. The concept of strict liability is a broader theory of liability
because it allows a plaintiff who is injured to recover for a harm,
regardless of a defendant's exercise of reasonable care in preventing
such an injury.88 In contrast, a plaintiff relying on negligence
per se must show that a defendant violated a statute or a court
order that is designed to protect him. Although the negligence
per se theory of liability similarly ignores the question whether the
defendant proceeded in a reasonable manner, it operates to impose
liability without fault when the statutory duty of care exceeds the
quantum of reasonableness required by the common law,8 9 or when
the statute's specificity leaves little room for individual discretion.
As a result, negligence per se approaches strict liability in the narrow sense that the application of either analysis to a given case could
8

6 Thayer, Public Wrong and PrivateAction, 27 Hanv. L. Ev. 317, 334 (1914).
87See Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N.Y. 531, 535, 108 N.E. 830, 831 (1915). The
tendency of the negligence per se theory to approach strict liability is mitigated in
some jurisdictions by the rule that the violation of a statute is only evidence of
negligence that may be rebutted. For a discussion of this version of negligence
per se, see Lowndes, supra note 57, at 366 n.10. Other jurisdictions give a defendant the opportunity to present an excuse after a prima facie case of tort liability for
the violation of a statute has been made by the plaintiff. These excuses include a
showing that the statutory breach was due to either a cause outside defendant's
control or an emergency or that the violation was merely a "technical" one. The
possibility of excuse is deemed to distinguish negligence per se from strict liability.
United States v. Burlington N., Inc., 500 F.2d 637, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1974). See
also New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Novick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1960).
Some courts follow the rule that if the evidence raises the issue of an excuse, then
the common law standard of reasonableness will be considered along with the
question of a statutory violation. E.g., Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892,
896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But see Morris, supra note 78, at 147 (urging that
jurisdictions in which a violation of a statute constitutes only "evidence of negligence"
should instead adopt the rule that "breach of the criminal proscription is negligence
as a matter of law").
As a mitigation of the strict liability tendencies of negligence per se, the possibility of excuse would not be a far-reaching defense because the arguments of
"impossibility" and "technicality" are limited. The possibility of avoiding the rigors
of negligence per se by pleading "some evidence" of excuse has been criticized for
the illogical disparity of the standards that are applied to one who can find no excuse
(negligence as a matter of law) and to another who can plead a plausible excuse
(common law reasonableness standard), even though this excuse may not be ultimately provable. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 498-502 (Tex.
1973) (Walker, J., concurring).
Ss See note 87 supra.
8
9 See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
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Furthermore, if the negli-

gence per se test gives a plaintiff a greater chance of success,9 0 then
a strict liability approach will provide an even surer and more
uniform result. A plaintiff need only show that his injury was
caused by an enterprise or individual subject to strict liability.91
Under a negligence per se analysis, the extent of a psychiatrist's
liability in a case like Semler will depend upon the breadth of the
class said to be protected by a court order or statute. The Semler
court combined an expansive interpretation of the class protected
by Judge Plummer's order with an inflexible standard of conduct
under the order to create a liability that could extend to harms resulting from any infraction of the court order's literal terms. The
realization that such an expansive definition of the protected class
places a heavy burden of strict liability on a defendant may have
produced those negligence per se cases where the rigors of strict
liability were avoided either by the curious assertion that a statute
is passed for the benefit of the public at large but not for any one
individual 92 or by the theory that the class protected by the statute
excludes the particular plaintiff. 93 If the Semler gloss is put on the
state statutes requiring judicial approval for release plans, then the
scope of psychiatrists' liability will be substantially widened to the
extent that psychiatrists will essentially be insurers of the public.
The direct application of strict liability principles is necessary
to avoid the problems caused by weaknesses in the Semler model. 94
90 See text accompanying note 84 supra.

91 See United States v. Burlington N., Inc., 500 F.2d 637, 640-41 (9th Cir.
1974) (under the theory of strict liability, a plaintiff may recover with a showing

of injury but not of negligence, whereas under negligence per se the showing of a
statutory violation is sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of negligence that the
defendant may rebut with proof of an excuse).
92 Quintano v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Colo. App. 319, 485 P.2d 733 (1971),
aff'd, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972).
93 Pernetti v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 582, 254 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Ct. Cl. 1964). In
Pernetti, a plaintiff sued for injuries inflicted by a released mental patient and relied
on a breach of N.Y. MENTAL HYGmNE LAw § 87(3)

(McKinney 1951)

(repealed

1973). This statute dictated that before a mental patient could be discharged from
a state mental hospital, the director of the institution was required to ascertain that
the release was not detrimental to the public welfare nor injurious to the patient;
additionally, the official was required to satisfy himself that friends or relatives of

the patient were able to care adequately for him. The Pernetti court commented:
The claimant then must further show that he is within the class sought to

be protected and, further, that the harm to which he has been subjected is
within the definition contemplated by the Legislature. The class of persons
sought to be protected by sections 87 and 88 is limited to the patients
involved, not the public at large.
44 Misc. 2d at 585, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
94 See text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
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For example, the problem of the irregular pattern of recovery by
victims will be ameliorated by providing a means of recovery when
negligence per se is unavailable as a theory of liability. This would
be the case when a particular release program was not within the
ambit of a statute or court order or when a plaintiff was not within
the class protected by such a statute or court order.9 5 The need
for statutes and court orders that require judicial approval for release programs could be eliminated because under the theory of
strict liability, plaintiffs need not demonstrate a violation of a
statute or a court order in order to establish a prima facie case for a
psychiatrist's liability. Judicial resources will be conserved and
consistency will be achieved. Despite the desirable results obtained
by the application of strict liability principles, the burden of
justifying the imposition of liability without fault upon psychiatrists in these situations is considerable.
The practice of releasing mentally ill offenders as a therapeutic measure has considerable social utility because it aids in rehabilitating society's less fortunate members. In light of the Semler
example, however, this practice will undoubtedly result in some
losses.9 6 Assuming such tragedies are inevitable, the remaining
issues are whether adequate reasons can be advanced to justify a
finding of strict liability as a general policy in cases where a released
mentally ill offender injures a member of the public, and, if so, the
form in which the policy should be applied.
B. Policy Aspects of the Expansion of Strict Liability
to the Release of Mentally Ill Offenders
Professor Fleming James has characterized the "typical modern
accident" as one where the victims tend to fall into lower economic
95 The interest in providing injured plaintiffs with a consistent pattern of recovery in products liability cases lead the California Supreme Court to hold that
"the very purpose of our pioneering efforts in this field [of imposing strict liability
for product defects] was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in
pursuing negligence . . . and thereby 'to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
Cronin v. J.B.E.
from defective products are born by the manufacturers .... .'
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442
(1972).

96 The loss in the Semler tragedy, as measured by the damages awarded to the
plaintiff in the district court, was the $25,000 stipulated to by the parties. The
Fourth Circuit found that the probation officer, Paul Folliard, was properly joined
as a third party; consequently, Dr. Wadeson and Folliard each contributed equally
to satisfying the judgment. 538 F.2d at 123 & n.1.
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brackets and those enterprises held liable under strict liability principles are equipped with the means of spreading the losses among
the beneficiaries of the enterprise. 97 Professor James attributes
society's willingness to impose liability without fault on a moral
climate that countenances the application of liability when a defendant realizes a gain for himself through another's loss, even
though the defendant is innocent of negligence. 9 A person engaging in such an activity generally assumes the risk involved because
he gains some personal benefit or stands to make an economic profit
which outweighs the potential liability; thus, the individual who
"commandeers another's interest in aid of his own necessities should
pay for any damage done thereto." 9D James hastens to point out,
however, that when a defendant's conduct is designed to advance the
interests of third parties rather than his own, this basis for liability
ceases to exist.10 0
Needless to say, a psychotherapist's interests are not greatly advanced by a program of releasing mentally ill offenders. Although
the treatment of mentally ill offenders is of itself an activity producing a certain monetary gain, 10 1 release programs entail no greater
profit or discernible benefit for the psychiatrist. In fact, the release
of a patient may have precisely the opposite effect by reducing the
patient's dependence on his therapist. A psychotherapist arguably
benefits financially from release programs to the extent that patients
who find such therapies attractive will seek out a therapist who
engages in release programs. Although this may be true of voluntary or civil committees, the commitment of mentally ill offenders
does not include a solicitation by the judge of the patient's preferences for therapy. Psychiatrists, therefore, could not be said to
derive so significant a monetary gain from the operation of release
97

James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv. 293,
296 (1958).
98Id.

99 Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of
Property and Personality, 39 HAEv. L. REv. 307, 316 (1926). See also Ognall,
Some Facets of Strict Tortious Liability in the United States and Their Implications,
33 Noamn DA m LAw. 239 (1958).
100 James, supra note 97, at 296.

101 Dr. Wadeson and the Psychiatric Institute were, for example, paid about
$3,000 per month for treating Gilreath.

Brief for Appellee at 5.

The plaintiff in

Semler intimated that Dr. Wadeson took the initiative in encouraging the Fairfax
County Circuit Court to send Gilreath to the Psychiatric Institute, but there was no
evidence that this suggestion was motivated by expectations of substantial financial
return. See id.
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programs as to justify imposing strict liability upon them for that
reason alone.
.The interests advanced by release programs are those
of the
patients themselves, and-more broadly-those of society in recovering balanced and productive individuals. A psychiatrist who nonnegligently authorizes the release of a mental patient cannot be said
to advance his own interests. In such cases, where the benefits of a
dangerous activity are said to be purely societal, "there is no reason
why one who acts as a champion of the public should be required
to pay for the privilege of so doing." 102 Consequently, in dealing
with the problem of the release of mentally ill offenders, any
application of a standard of strict liability must justify shifting the
10 3
loss to a defendant-psychotherapist.
One such justification is a psychotherapist's superior riskbearing capacity 104 based on the fact that psychiatrists generally
carry liability insurance. 10 5 Although potential victims such as
Natalia Semler might purchase insurance against random assault
by mental patients, such a loss is so sporadic and unlikely that they
cannot reasonably be expected to obtain insurance. 10 6 Because the
incidence of violence among released mentally ill offenders is
predictable in an aggregate sense, a treating therapist is in a better
position than potential victims to estimate his potential liability.
He can best determine the appropriate amount of insurance needed
to cover the risk he bears.10 7 Although a psychiatrist cannot predict
precisely which of his patients will harm a member of the public
upon release, he can at least anticipate that a few are likely to do so.
The crux of this analysis is that a psychiatrist, as a professional
enterprise, can estimate his liability, purchase insurance, and
thereby spread the risk of loss among others in the insurance pool.
1o2 Bohlen, supra note 99, at 317-18. Boblen's analysis extends only as far as
the invasion of personality interests; injury to personal and real property are not
relieved by the privilege of acting in the interest of society in general. Id. 321.
103 See Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HAimv.
L. R v. 453, 463-64 (1933).
104 See Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YAY.n
LJ. 1172, 1176 (1952). See also Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, I., concurring).
105 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 53; Peck, Negligence and Liability Without
Fault in Tort Law, 46 WAsH. L. R-y. 225, 241 (1971).
106 See Note, supra note 53.
107 Cf. Morris, supra note 104, at 1177-78 (for purpose of insuring against
harm caused by contractor's explosions, warehouse owner is better able to estimate
insurance needs).
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Although distributional considerations play a major role in
determining that a Semler-type loss should be shifted to the nonnegligent psychiatrist, the imposition of the loss on Dr. Wadeson
can also be justified under formulations of the strict liability theory
that do not primarily consider distributional factors. Professor
George Fletcher has argued that "the paradigm of reciprocity accounts for the typical cases of strict liability..
" 108
In explicating this "paradigm of reciprocity" as a theory of liability,
Fletcher states that:
[A] victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a
risk greater in degree and different in order from those
created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in
short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks.
Cases of liability are those in which the defendant generates a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative
to the victim's risk-creating activity. 10 9
According to this theory, which is better characterized as a "fairness" rationale for strict liability "10 rather than a "mechanism of
insurance," 11 "[t]he social costs and utility of the risk are irrelevant,
as is the impact of the judgment on socially desirable forms of behavior." 112 An individual has basic interests in his life, health,
liberty, property, reputation, and privacy and "cannot fairly be
expected to suffer . . . deprivation in the name of a utilitarian
calculus." 113 This theory requires that unless the excuses of compulsion or unavoidable ignorance 114 are proven, a person who
injures another, or permits a third party to injure another, must
108 Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Hatv. L. REv. 537, 544
(1972) (footnote omitted).
109 Id. 542.
1

0

The different "manifestations of the paradigm of reciprocity . .. express the
same principle of fairness: all individuals in society have the right to roughly the
same degree of security from risk." Id. 550.
'

M11
"Because of the market relationship between the manufacturer and the
consumer, loss-shifting in products-liability cases becomes a mechanism of insurance,
changing the question of fairness posed by imposing liability." Id. 544 n.24.
122

Id. 540-41.

.13 Id.

568.

L14
Id. 554.
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absorb the loss inflicted on the other, even if the activity involved
is socially useful, when the risks created are nonreciprocal. 115
The fairness rationale favors the imposition of strict liability
upon a psychiatrist for a death caused by his patient rather than
upon a victim who would otherwise bear the loss. Natalia Semler's
case, for example, falls squarely within the Fletcher analysis: Dr.
Wadeson exposed her to a nonreciprocal risk because the risk that
Gilreath would attack her far exceeded any risk that she created in
her daily activities. This formulation can be articulated by stating
that, given an individual's inability to anticipate and prevent injuries inflicted by released mentally ill offenders, that individual
should not have to bear the ultimate costs resulting from the risk
involved. Therefore, although the release of mentally ill offenders
has an overall societal benefit, the paradigm of reciprocity requires
that strict liability principles apply to such programs.
Those concerned with efficiency considerations, such as Professor Guido Calabresi, advocate the imposition of liability on the
party who is in the better position to judge "whether avoidance
costs would exceed foreseeable accident costs and to act on that
judgment." 111 This test for strict liability depends upon the ability
of the respective parties to perceive that they are in categories of
great risk so that they may avoid the risk. Unlike the negligence
analysis this test does not depend upon the judgment that a party
should have avoided the accident costs because his avoidance costs
were less than the foreseeable accident costs.'1 7 Strict liability for
Professor Calabresi thus centers around the problem of knowledge.
The Calabresi approach also favors applying strict liability to the
release of mentally ill offenders. For example, Natalia Semler was
115 See id. 568-69. This test differs from the test of negligence in that the
risk created by the defendant, while greater than that created by the victim, may
still yield sufficient utility to be called non-negligent under the conventional analysis.
116 Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YAXX
LJ. 1055, 1060 (1972) (footnote omitted). Calabresi and Hirschoff sum up their
test for strict liability in the following passage:
just as the employer may be in the better position to evaluate the costs and
benefits of a piece of equipment given the likelihood of occasional employee
negligence (defendant's strict liability), so a spectator at a baseball game
may be best suited to evaluate the desirability of sitting in an unscreened
bleacher given the likelihood of occasional negligent wild throws by the
players during the game which may result in the spectator's being hit on
the head (plaintiff's strict liability, or assumption of risk).
Id. 1065 (footnote omitted); cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (an injured party is not
in a position to identify product defects).
117 Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 116, at 1060.
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in an inferior position vis-a-vis Dr. Wadeson with respect to her
ability to perceive and avoid danger because she had neither notice
of Gilreath's release nor warning that he should be avoided under
certain circumstances. In other words, Natalia Semler could not
have known of the danger that she was exposed to on October
29, 1973.
The imposition of strict liability on psychiatrists insures that an
injured plaintiff will be able to recover for the harm inflicted by a
released patient. If psychiatrists must personally absorb the full
increase in liability however, they will be less willing to continue
to release mentally ill offenders because they realize that some harm,
and thus some personal liability on their part, is inevitable.
Psychiatrists would be tempted "to revert to the outmoded and
disadvantageous system of confining the mental defective, of keeping
him under constant surveillance, while he is being trained to make
those social adjustments essential to independent and successful
living." 11s Consequently, the imposition of strict liability could
have the negative impact of denying to mentally ill offenders a
treatment that could facilitate their recovery, thereby hampering
their rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the disincentive that strict liability places on the release of mentally ill offenders can be alleviated
by a tax-funded insurance plan that covers psychiatrists' increased
liability under a strict liability theory for damage perpetrated by
released mentally ill offenders.
C. Mechanism for Implementing Strict Liability Principles
in the Release of Mentally Ill Offenders
If release programs function as they have in the past and strict
liability principles are applied instead of the negligence per se
theory, psychiatrists will be exposed to a greater degree of liability.
Consequently, the insurance premiums of psychiatrists will increase
in order to cover this greater incidence of liability. The imposition
of strict liability without implementing some form of tax-funded
insurance for the additional liability might deter the socially desirable activity of releasing mentally ill offenders as a therapeutic
measure.1 1 9 The deterrent effect would not be offset by other
factors because a psychiatrist has no peculiar interest, in other than
118 Excelsior Ins. Co. v. State, 296 N.Y. 40, 46, 69 N.E.2d 553, 556 (1946);
Absolute Liability for UltrahazardousActivities: An Appraisal of the
Comment,
see
Restatement Doctrine, 37 CAL. L. PEv. 269 (1949).

I 9 See text accompanying notes 117-118 supra.
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a professional or moral sense, in release programs that cause the
loss. 120 If the mentally ill offenders are viewed as the only beneficiaries of release programs the cost of such programs should be
spread among them by including a pro- rata portion of the extra
premium charge in the psychiatric fees assessed to these patients.
The application of strict liability, however, is also beneficial to
society as well as to the participating patients.
The consistency of recovery for injured victims that is fostered
by strict liability instead of the haphazard recovery for some under a
negligence per se approach is a societal benefit. Furthermore, the
conservation of judicial resources and the easing of other institutional strains also benefits society in general. These considerations dictate that the increases in insurance premiums resulting
from the imposition of liability without fault on psychiatrists
should be financed by the community through its taxing power.
Fairness dictates that the public treasury bear the financial burden
of a change that benefits the general public:
As a matter of abstract fairness it would seem, if the business is one which is essential to the good of the State as a
community and yet is of a sort that would not attract
private enterprise, if it were forced to bear, as part of its
operating expense, the cost. . . of making good the harm
which it causes to others, that the State itself should relieve the business of this burden, either by paying for the
loss itself or by reimbursing the business which itself is to
make the payment.. In either event the payment would
finally be made out of the public funds raised by taxation.
121

The overall societal benefit derived from release programs
justifies the proposition that any additional liability incurred by
psychiatrists as a result of the imposition of strict liability should
be absorbed by society through a system of tax-funded insurance.
On the other hand, the overall societal benefit may be viewed as
too attenuated to justify an assessment of the total costs of release
12 0 See generally Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher in, 59 U.

PA.

L.

REv. 423, 444-45 n.136 (1911).
121 Bohlen, supra note 120, at 444-45 n.136.

One observer notes that strict

liability is often imposed on public utilities because the rate structure, the vehicle
for spreading losses, approaches the taing power possessed by a municipality-a
power that may be used to share the burden of losses incurred by carrying on a

communally beneficial activity. Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 61
HAry. L. REV. 515, 523 (1948).
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programs against the public treasury. Participating patients, as
primary beneficiaries of the programs, should continue to bear a
portion of the cost of the total liability. Under the present system
of negligence liability, the cost of release programs is ultimately
borne by the patients because they are assessed a pro rata portion
of the psychiatrists' liability insurance premium charge in their
fees. The present system would not be changed under a system of
strict liability because only the additional premium which psychiatrists must pay will be tax-funded.
Although the application of strict liability constitutes a sound
policy in this area, it also limits the role of the courts in monitoring
psychiatrists' release decisions; nevertheless, the need for a reviewing
forum endures to insure that mentally ill patients are not released
in a perfunctory manner. The formality of review requires the
treating psychiatrist to explicate his reasons for believing that a
particular patient will benefit from release. It is difficult for a
psychotherapist acting alone to ascertain whether to release a patient
who may have latent anti-social tendencies. Great caution should
therefore be exercised in the release of mentally ill offenders; the
necessary degree of caution could be assured by requiring that the
treating psychiatrist present his decisions to release to an independent panel of psychiatrists within the hospital where he practices
122
rather than to a court.
New York law presently provides that before a mentally ill
offender can be released, the court to which the petition has been
made may appoint up to two psychiatrists to examine the patient
and make recommendations to the court. 2 3 As a result, the court
not only obtains additional expert advice on which to base a decision, but if the judge denies the petition for release, he is in a
position to inform the treating psychiatrist in some detail of the
technical issues prompting the denial. The judge's articulation of
a rationale is more helpful to the treating psychiatrist than is a
refusal, to release which is founded on an amorphous and uninformed uncertainty as to the wisdom of releasing the patient in
question. Likewise, direct review of a release decision by an independent panel of psychiatrists would enable the panel to advise the
122 Cf. Oto FEv. CODE ANN. §2945.39 (Anderson 1975) (requiring that a
mentally ill offender must be released by the majority decision of a panel composed
of the common pleas judge sitting in the district where the patient is confined, the
superintendent of the hospital, and an alienist, a person who specializes in the study
of mental disease).
123 N.Y. Cnam. PNo. LAw § 330.20 (McKinney Supp. 1976). Cf. ALI MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.08 (1962) (the court "shall" appoint "at least" two psychiatrists).
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treating psychiatrist in order to confer the benefit of their combined expertise. The panel may be able to inform the treating
psychiatrist of new diagnostic techniques or of technical information
that will help him to sharpen his skills. The collegial atmosphere
in which such exchanges are likely to take place is more conducive
to instruction than is the atmosphere of a courtroom and will approximate the team-approach to treatment that is prevalent in most
mental hospitals.
Such a panel of psychiatrists would be just as cautious as a
judge in determining which patients should be released. Ethics
and professional pride would check any over-enthusiasm for the
release of mentally ill offenders. The prospect of defending an
embarrassing lawsuit will undoubtedly exercise a moderating influence on the panel because the psychiatrists on the panel might
be impleaded in a tort suit that ensues when a released patient
harms a member of the public. Even if the liability that results is
covered by a scheme of tax-funded insurance, such panels serve both
to check the treating psychiatrist's diagnosis and to limit the need
for judicial intervention in these issues.
One remaining problem under the strict liability approach is
that of the duration of a psychiatrist's liability for injuries inflicted
by his patients after release. It is unclear whether mentally ill
offenders who commit acts of violence after release do so relatively
soon after release or somewhat later. In any case, limitations on
psychiatrists' exposure to liability are imposed, in a practical sense,
through the inquiries of proximate cause: whether the harm is of
the type that was reasonably foreseeable; whether intervening
causes immunized the defendant from liability; whether the injury
was sufficiently removed temporally from the risk-creating activity
so as to terminate liability. These aspects of the inquiry into
liability will remain unchanged.
D. Application of Strict Liability to State-Employed Psychiatrists
A final consideration is the extent to which the personal
liability of a psychiatrist may be rendered nugatory by sovereign
immunity. In cases where the psychiatrist is a state employee, the
state's liability may be limited by its sovereign immunity. 2 4 Of
124 Comment, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities: An Appraisal of
the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CAL. L. REv. 269, 280 (1949). For a survey of the
extent of the states' waiver of sovereign immunity, see Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. BEv. 1363 (1954); for a corresponding waiver
by the federal government, see the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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course, it is possible. for the state to waive sovereign immunity and
thus become a financially attractive defendant because of its ability
to assess directly the losses to the community through taxation. In
that event, the tax-funded insurance scheme suggested above may
therefore be unnecessary for publicly-employed psychiatrists. Nevertheless, this observation fails to resolve the issue of the public
official's residual liability when a state has not consented to be sued.
For example, California has provided for the situation presented
by the Semler case by legislating an immunity that might cover the
treating psychiatrist:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee acting
within the scope of his employment is liable for any injury
resulting from determining in accordance with any applicable enactment . .

.

[w]hether to parole, grant a leave

of absence to, or release a person confined for mental illness or addiction.1 25
Several other states have enacted similar immunities for public offi26
cials who release mental patients.
The broad rule concerning public officials' tort liability is that
public officials "are not generally liable for the injurious consequences of discretionary action or non-action." 127 The converse
of a discretionary duty is one that is ministerial; a public official
may be held liable if a ministerial duty is negligently performed. 28
If the release of a mentally ill offender is considered a discretionary
act, then immunity is conferred upon a publicly-employed psychotherapist. Professor James has aptly remarked that "discretion" is a
very broad term; even the manner in which a nail is driven or the
12 5 CArL. Gov'T CoDE

§856(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977) (amending CAL. Gov'r
§ 856(a) (3) (West 1966)). See also Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301,
87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970). A California psychiatrist is under a statutory obligation
to get court approval before releasing a patient. See note 75 supra. Thus, publiclyemployed California psychiatrists who proceed as Dr. Wadeson did in Semler may
fall outside the protection of § 856(a)(3) because they could not be said to have
acted in accordance with any applicable enactment.
CoDE

126 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.200 (1977); S.D. Compmam
A-,-N. § 27A-14-15 (1976).
'

2

LAws

7 James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Offlcers, 22 U. CHr.

L. RLv. 610, 645 (1955) (footnote omitted).
128 Semer v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 827 (1976).
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speed at which a post-office truck is driven involves discretion.12
The Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. United States,130 did little to
narrow the scope of "discretionary" duties when it stated: "Where
there is room for policy judgement and decision there is discretion." 231 Nevertheless, the tendency has been to define "dis32
cretionary" broadly in favor of immunity.
In Semler, the probation officer argued that his basic duties
were discretionary in nature rather than ministerial. The Semler
court noted that the Virginia definition of a ministerial act is "one
which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety
of the act being done." 133 Folliard argued that because no specific
duties were demanded of him by Judge Plummer, the probation
officer could not be said to have acted in a ministerial capacity when
134
he failed to obtain the judge's approval for Gilreath's release.
The Fourth Circuit replied, however, that although Folliard was
vested with the discretionary duty of issuing passes to Gilreath, the
12 9 James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function"
Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 184,
185 (1957). See also Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
130346 U.S. 15 (1953).

131 Id. 36. The Dalehite Court added that "the alleged 'negligence' does not
subject the Government to liability" because "[tihe decisions held culpable were all
responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level...." Id. 42. This
lead to the claim in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), that
negligence at an operational level was not immune from liability; the Supreme
Court agreed. The implications of this holding are unclear because specifying what
is meant by "operational" is about as problematic as defining "discretionary." See
James, supra note 129. Not surprisingly, Paul Folliard requested in his petition for
a writ of certiorari that the Supreme Court clarify the scope of "ministerial" and
"discretionary" duties in the Semler situation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-20.
132 James, supra note 127, at 645. The policy justification for this tendency
was articulated by Mr. Justice Harlan in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959):
It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to
exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect
of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume time
and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service
and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effective administration of policies of government.
Id. 571. Accord, Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950).
133 538 F.2d at 127 (quoting Dovel v. Bertram, 184 Va. 19, 22, 34 S.E.2d 369,
370 (1945)).
134 Reply Brief for Appellant Folliard at 3.
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requirement that he request approval for changes in Gilreath's
status was judicially mandated and therefore ministerial.18
If Dr. Wadeson had been employed by the State of Virginia, his
situation would have been similar to that of Folliard. Although
some courts have held that the diagnosis and treatment of a
patient 136 and the selection of factual material to present to a
court.137 come within the scope of the discretionary function, the
Fourth Circuit probably would have ruled that the judicial mandate requiring court approval for a change in Gilreath's status similarly made a state-employed psychiatrist's duty a ministerial function. The Semler analysis would probably expose a state-employed
psychiatrist to substantial tort liability. A better solution in the case
of publicly-employed psychiatrists is to reject an analysis based upon
the discretionary duty/ministerial duty distinction and instead enact
waivers of sovereign immunity altogether as to liability for injuries
caused by mentally ill offenders released from state facilities. The
taxing power here could be used expressly both to protect publiclyemployed psychiatrists from the disincentive to release patients and
to compensate victims for their losses. In that way, public reimbursement for a plaintiff's injuries in this situation would parallel
the tax-funded insurance plan suggested for private practitioners.
The tax-funded insurance plan for private practitioners and the
expanded waiver of sovereign immunity for publicly-employed
psychiatrists represent compromise solutions for the imposition of
strict liability on release programs. Nevertheless, despite the many
benefits of these proposals, legislators may still be apprehensive that
the waiver of sovereign immunity for release programs and the
concomitant use of the taxing power to spread losses incurred by
release programs may be too costly to implement. In making a
cost-benefit analysis, however, legislators should recognize that the
losses that may be inflicted by a certain percentage of released
patients should be offset against the savings that result from the
reduction in the mental hospital population. 138 Although this
consideration may fail to persuade state legislatures to widen the
waiver of sovereign immunity to include tort liability for the re135 538 F.2d at 127.

136 Hendry v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 27, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969); Fahey v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 878, 886 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
137 Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 307, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1970).
13 8 See Wolpert & Wolpert, The Relocation of Released Mental Hospital Patients
Into Residential Communities, 7 Por'y Sci. 31 (1976).
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lease of mentally ill offenders or to implement a subsidy for the
increased insurance premiums of private practitioners, it should at
least be taken into account.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Release programs involving mentally ill offenders raise difficult
issues concerning the discretion that psychiatrists may exercise in
the treatment of the mentally ill, and the degree of care that the
courts may legitimately demand from these professionals. The
social benefit of release programs seems questionable in light of
such tragedies as the Semler incident, although society is now committed to exploring new techniques of rehabilitating the mentally
ill and cannot return to the solution of permanent confinement.
When the experiment goes awry, someone must pay the price.
Because the justification for the imposition of tort liability depends
upon the degree to which sound policy is advanced,139 the effect of
imposing such liability must be considered with respect to the competing values of assuring the safety of the community and of rehabilitating the mentally ill. The strict liability approach, unlike
the negligence per se approach of the Semler court, does not
entangle the courts in professional decisions by psychiatrists concerning the treatment of their patients; yet the imposition of strict
liability guarantees that victims will be compensated for injuries
inflicted by released patients. The existence of independent panels
of psychiatrists to review a treating psychiatrist's decision to release
would insure that some check on the treating psychiatrist will be
exercised. Treating psychiatrists, through the mechanisms of insurance and fee structures, are often able to spread losses that will
occur despite the exercise of due care on their part; however, the
burdens of increased premiums may deter the release of mentally
ill offenders. Thus, the case for strict liability is greatly weakened
unless government subsidy of these programs, in the form of taxfunded supplementary insurance premiums, is made available to
psychiatrists who are subject to a scheme of strict liability.
In addition to the review panels of psychiatrists, another suggestion for mitigating the risks inherent in release programs is the
improvement of community facilities for follow-up treatment of
outpatients. Discharges conditioned on mandatory attendance at
139 Morris, supra note 61, at 22.
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outpatient clinics will probably enable psychiatrists to intervene
before a relapse into violent behavior occurs; efforts should be
made to identify those patients who are in greatest need of follow-up
services. 140
Because the purpose of release programs is to enable the
mentally ill offender to deal with the problems of freedom and selfrestraint himself, the imposition of strict liability on those who
make the crucial decision whether to release must accommodate the
interests of both the patient and the public. 1 41 The attachment of
strict liability to programs where mentally ill offenders are released
into the community represents an effort to balance the interests of
the mentally ill, the public, and the courts.
140

Zitrin, Hardesty, Burdock, & Drossman, Crime and Violence Among Mental
Patients, 133 Am. J. Psycam 142, 147 (1976). Cf. Climent & Plutchik, Use of a
Discharge Potential Scale as a Monitoring Technique for Psychiatric Patients, 10
Soc. PsYcH. 51 (1975) (rating system based on nurses' day-to-day observations of
pathological symptoms may be an accurate indication of a level of improvement that
is sufficient to warrant a patient's discharge).
141 See St. George v. State, 283 App. Div. 245, 248, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150,
aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954).

